Local historian discovers ‘hidden’ Civil War ford

        One such landmark was a “hidden ford” that saved Gen. Datus Coon’s 1,200-man Union cavalry brigade & its attached artillery battery from certain destruction on Shoals Creek, near the discharge of Butler Creek. Where was this ford–this ford without a name? Maps from the time period showed the Cowpens Ford (named Goose Shoals today, where County Road 8 crosses Shoals Creek), just south of the mouth of Butler Creek. Most historical maps prominently show the old Savannah Ford farther north, almost hidden now as this road crossing was abandoned many years ago. It’s located south of where Shoals Creek crosses the Alabama-Tennessee line.

      First, let’s take a look at what Coon’s brigade was doing at the time & his own report related to the hidden ford. In early November, 1864, Gen. John Bell Hood’s Army of Tennessee was preparing to invade Tennessee, with a base around Florence & Tuscumbia. Bad wea1ther & poor logistical support had delayed the advance into Tennessee. Plus, Hood was anxiously awaiting needed cavalry reinforcements under Gen. Nathan Bedford Forrest, who would lead the invasion northward & limit the prying eyes of the Yankee cavalry from discovering their intentions.

       Union Gen. George H. Thomas had placed Federal cavalry to watch Hood’s movements. At first he had only Gen. John Croxton’s reinforced brigade, which was roughed up quite a bit when Hood first crossed the river & then several days later at the Huntsville Road crossing of Shoals Creek. Thomas, as quickly as he could get more cavaliers diverted to his department, added Gen. Edward Hatch’s full cavalry division to Croxton’s command. That gave Hatch over 3,000 mounted troops & several pieces of artillery to watch Hood from the east side of Shoals Creek. Coon’s brigade was part of Hatch’s division. There was also as small Union cavalry brigade stationed around Waynesboro but there was no link between the two commands, leaving a hole in the Union lines that Thomas increasingly worried the Rebels would exploit.

     For several days, Thomas continuously wired Hatch’s superiors in Pulaski, and finally Hatch himself, asking if he had linked up with the troops in Waynesboro. Hatch finally took some action around Nov. 14. He ordered Coon to withdraw from his location watching the Military Road crossing of Shoals Creek, move around the Confederate flank on Shoals Creek & camp on the west side of the stream, which was north of the enemy’s positions. From there, Coon could communicate with the Union troops in Waynesboro.

     Here is General Coon’s report from that time period:

“November 14, the detail to fell trees reported all roads effectually blockaded in compliance with orders.” (This would be the roads across & leading to the Military Road from Florence to Nashville)

“November 15, at 4 a. m., moved out on military road toward Lawrenceburg, and camped at Wilcoxson’s plantation, five miles distant.” (More than likely this is just west of present day Green Hill, along Cowpen Creek)

“November 16, left the military road at 8 a. m., passed down the valley of Wolf Creek, and crossed Shoal Creek at Wolf Ford (this is just north of the Alabama-Tennessee state line); moved from the opposite side to Aberdeen (near present-day Pruitton), thence to Big Butler (creek), and down to Little Butler (creek), from which place moved directly south toward Wilson’s Cross-Roads (present-day St. Florian). After passing a mile, the advance, the Second Iowa Cavalry, found the enemy’s pickets (most likely posted at the crossroads of county roads 8 & 61) and dashed at them furiously, and ran them into their reserve pell-mell, which created a stampede of the whole command, composed of General Roddey’s brigade, which, in turn, ran back to their infantry camps in great confusion. Through the gallant conduct of Lieutenant Griffith, of Company D of the above named regiment, we captured several prisoners, who informed us of many important facts touching the movements of the enemy. After having forced Roddey within the infantry lines, I became satisfied that the enemy were continually receiving re enforcements, and that Forrest had recently joined Hood (on the 14th), and that the location about the two Butler Creeks was not the most safe for the camp of a cavalry command. I therefore took the responsibility of recrossing Shoal Creek at the Savannah Ford, and went into camp at Hains’ plantation, three miles from Cowpen Mills.” (The Confederate infantry lines were at Wilson’s Crossroads–today’s St. Florian. Coons doesn’t make communication with the troops in Waynesboro. Hatch expected them to be near the Butler creeks–those troops in Waynesboro covering the area from there to the west bank of Shoal Creek. It isn’t clear if he’s OK with Coon moving back to the east side of Shoal Creek.)

“November 17, moved camp to Cowpen Mills and sent patrols three miles across Shoal Creek. Found the enemy in force.” (This is near where Cowpen Creek empties into Shoal Creek, along County Road 8. It’s three miles from where he encountered Confederate pickets at or near the crossroads the day prior.)

“November 18, made reconnaissance across Shoal Creek with the entire brigade three miles to Butler Creek and Florence road (County Road 61), and sent the Second Iowa Cavalry as patrols to the Florence and Waynesborough road (to present-day Chisholm Road near Zip City, via County Road 8), entering that road four miles distant, returned to Cowpen Mills and camped.” (Apparently, due to the activity the two days prior, the Confederate pickets withdrew further south from the county roads 8 & 61 crossroads.

Thomas continues to be unhappy that his two cavalry commands are still not communicating. Hatch will order Coon again to cross the creek, camp & establish a picket line north of Confederate positions west of Shoal Creek and potentially link up with the troops in Waynesboro. It appears in hindsight that Hatch expected those troops to move towards him, which never happened.)

“November 19, in compliance with orders from division commander, moved my brigade across Shoal Creek at Cowpen Ford, for the purpose of camping on Butler Creek. – On reaching the Butler Creek road, three miles west, drove in the enemy’s picket, and sent Capt. A. B. Mock, of Ninth Illinois Cavalry, commanding battalion, to patrol the Waynesborough road. The main column turned north to Butler’s Creek, while Capt. J. W. Harper, with the remainder of his regiment (the Ninth Illinois Cavalry), stood picket on the road running south toward Florence. I remained with my escort at the cross-roads to see the train safely closed up for three-quarters of an hour, when I was informed by an orderly that the Second Iowa had met the enemy in heavy force, and that Buford’s division was in their front, on Big Butler Creek. At about this moment Captain Harper reported the enemy pressing his picket from the south, and that they had the appearance of being infantry. Leaving an orderly to close the column I sent another to inform Captain Harper that he must hold his position at all hazards until the pack train and artillery had passed, as it was impossible, from the bad condition of the road, to halt or return by the same route. I then rode rapidly to the Second Iowa, and found them engaged with a superior force. I immediately sent the train and artillery down the valley of the Little Butler, accompanied by the Sixth Illinois as escort, Major Whitsit commanding, who was instructed to take all axes and spades and make a crossing on Shoal Creek at all hazards, as this was the only place of escape from a well devised trap of the enemy. The next thirty minutes were passed in great anxiety, as Buford, on the north, was pressing the Second Iowa hard in front and flanking on their right and left with vastly superior numbers, while the Ninth Illinois was heavily pressed in the rear by a force from the south. During this time a messenger was sent to Captain Mock, informing him of his situation, and that unless he returned soon I would be compelled to abandon the last place left for his escape. As the Ninth Illinois came up they passed to the right and rear of the Second Iowa, down the Little Butler, and forming a line dismounted at the junction of the Big and Little Butler, where the high and abrupt bluffs on either side made the valley quite narrow. This made a good support for the Second Iowa when compelled to fall back. By this time the situation of the Second Iowa became truly critical, in consequence of the rapid movements of the rebel flanking column, which reached nearly to their rear on the right and left. Seeing it was impossible to hold the gap until Captain Mock could be heard from I ordered Major Horton to fall back and form again in rear of the Ninth Illinois. Each regiment then fell back alternately and formed lines for two miles, when we reached Shoal Creek, and I found, to my great surprise, the Sixth Illinois pack train, artillery, and ambulances all safe on the opposite side, and the regiment dismounted to cover the crossing. A lively skirmish was kept up by the rear guard while the command passed down the steep miry bank by file obliquely 150 feet. The mortification and apparent chagrin of the rebels when they found their prey had unexpectedly escaped was made known by those hideous yells, such as only rebels can make. I carefully placed my pickets on all practicable roads and encamped at dark at the same place I had left in the morning, with the firm conclusion, as previously reported, that Butler’s Creek was by no means a desirable location to encamp. The day had been one of incessant rain.”

(It’s obvious that Coon had protested, perhaps quite often, about camping on Butler Creek. The general was a newspaperman before the war & I always smile when I read the line “The mortification and apparent chagrin of the rebels when they found their prey had unexpectedly escaped was made known by those hideous yells, such as only rebels can make.” One of Coon’s subordinates had learned of the crossing–a hidden ford, if you will–the day before, the account of which is in a regimental history. The subordinate, on his own initiative, set up the defensive position at the creek and crossed the brigade’s train & artillery to the opposite bank. I’m not sure why Coon did not give him credit in his report. Remember, also, there had been almost constant rain for a couple of weeks and the creek levels had risen. A ford would be the only place to cross the stream safely. More about the hidden ford later.)

“November 20, moved from Cowpen Mills at 3 a. m., going toward the military road. On arriving at that place halted for an hour, when I received orders to move to Bluewater Creek and camp, leaving pickets on military road. Captain Mock, of the 9th Illinois Cavalry, reported on military road, having traveled all night to reach the command. He succeeded in reaching the Waynesborough road, but in returning found himself and command completely surrounded by the enemy, and took to the hills by meandering neighborhood roads. By accident he came upon General Chalmers’ division wagon train and made a charge on the guard, capturing several wagons and prisoners and fifty mules, besides much plunder which he could not bring away. While in the act of destroying the train he was attacked by a superior force and compelled to leave all and take to the woods again. By the assistance of Union men and negroes he was guided by circuitous routes until he reached the column. His loss was thirty men, most of whom were taken prisoners. Papers conveying important information were captured with the train, information which must have been of infinite importance to General Thomas, as they detailed the movements about to be made, giving timely notice to all of what was to take place. Captain Mock is entitled to much credit for the skill displayed in bringing out his command with so little loss. At sunset the pickets on the military road were attacked and compelled to fall back. Patrols sent to the military road and the front on all roads during the fore part of the night found the enemy advancing in force.”

Interesting story–one that isn’t well known in Lauderdale County. The Federal troops had definitely gotten in a trap, although it of their own doing as the Confederates hadn’t planned anything. Confederate troops under Gen. Abraham Buford had moved their camp northeastward to be ready for the upcoming campaign northward. One of Buford’s Kentucky brigades was foraging near the Pruitton area when the 2nd Iowa Cavalry came upon them, leading to a firefight. Naturally, Buford’s troops rallied to the firing & soon outnumbered the Iowans. The Iowans were armed with Spencer repeating rifles, so they were able to hold their own & gave up ground slowly. In this action Col. Edward Crossland, commanding the Kentuckians, was severely wounded and would not participate in the upcoming Tennessee campaign.

      Also advancing that day, north on the Butler Creek Road, was Gen. Frank Armstrong’s Confederate cavalry brigade. He ran headlong into the Yankee troops just south of the county roads 8 & 62 crossroads.

 

Neither Confederate general realized the predicament that the Yankee troopers were in nor understood the terrain. Forrest, their commander, was miles away & perhaps still in Florence. Had it actually been a trap, the outcome would have been much bloodier & perhaps as dire as Coon’s report stated. There was a road leading directly to Coon’s rear from the south. Its use would have been disastrous for his command.

      As it was, the event became a Union advantage. One dispatch, found by Capt. Anthony R. Mock in Chalmers’ headquarters wagon, contained so much information about Rebel plans that Hatch could withdraw all his troops from the Shoal Creek line to Lawrenceburg to await the advance of Forrest’s troops. Now, as the Union cavalrymen knew where the Confederates were heading, their infantry could immediately leave Pulaksi & head north on a race towards Nashville. The information was helpful as the Federal infantry would only beat Forrest’s troopers & the Confederate infantry by a few hours to Columbia & the Duck River.

     Oh, I almost forgot–the ford does have a name. Or, at least, it had a name for a short while. It’s called Section Ford & you can see it on a 1930s-era agricultural map. Go figure.

 

 

Photo details: